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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses the methodology and some results to assess the means and costs of meeting the
Kyoto target for Greenhouse gas emissions in Belgium. This target consists in reducing the emissions
of Greenhouse gasses in 2008-2012 by 7.5% compared to the level of 1990. Here we assume that this
target has to be met in Belgium and that no tradable permits or other flexible mechanisms can be used
to achieve the required reduction in Belgium. This paper can therefore serve as an input into policy
debates at the European level on flexible mechanisms and on coordination of Greenhouse policies.
The second chapter concentrates on the methodological aspects of this study. We explain how we
represent carbon emissions in the economy, what models we use, how we construct scenarios and
what cost concepts are chosen. In the third chapter we present the Reference with its macro-economic
and energy price assumptions. It is a detailed scenario for the future GHG emissions in Belgium that
takes into account the policy measures already decided. The fourth chapter is devoted to the ‘Kyoto’
scenario. In this scenario the GHG emissions are reduced in function of their costs in order to achieve
the 'Kyoto' target. The last chapter presents a few sensitivity studies.
What greenhouse gasses are covered
The greenhouse gasses covered in this study are CO2, CH4 and N2O emitted on the Belgian territory,
with the exception of emissions from marine and aviation bunkers (used for international transport).
For these gases, only energy related emissions are studied using appropriate models. Process
emissions and emissions from the agricultural sector of CH4 and N2O are not considered in this study.
Energy related emissions for CH4 and N2O account respectively for 8 % and 22 % of total emission
levels for these gases. Together, the emissions considered represent 87% of the total emissions
covered by the Kyoto protocol. All the results are derived for an average outside temperature
2.
                                                  
2 The baseline for the Kyoto target are the observed emissions in 1990. Weather conditions in that year deviated from the average
conditions. The scenario results we present are defined for average weather conditions.4
2. THE METHODOLOGY
This section explains the methodology used in this study. We proceed in 4 steps. We first explain how
we represent carbon emissions in an economy. What is the level of detail aimed at? How do we
combine technological and behavioural information in models?  The second step is to show how we
use models to build a reference and to build alternative scenarios. The next step is to define the three
cost concepts that we use in this study. The final step is to discuss the relationship between the choice
of policy instruments and the type of cost concept to be used. It is important and helpful to make the
distinction between measures and policy instruments. By ‘measures’ we understand technological
measures or behavioural measures which can be taken by the economic agent to reduce his emissions,
by ‘instrument’ we understand policy actions which the policy maker can implement to induce the
economic agent to undertake a specific measure.
2.1. How do we represent the carbon emissions of an economy
In the energy sector, carbon emissions are equal to primary energy
3 consumption of a country
multiplied by specific emission factors and corrected for sinks
4. In order to build scenarios for future
emissions and for reductions of emissions we need to know the driving forces of these emissions. The
driving force of emissions is energy use, which is itself driven by economic activity, prices and
technological possibilities.
In Table 1, first line, the different steps, from economic activity to primary energy use, are
represented. The second and third lines explain how each driving force contributes to lower GHG
emissions. The bottom lines of the table are used later to illustrate how these different driving forces
are represented in models.
The aggregate level of economic activity is the driving force as it determines the level of economic
production activities and the level of income available to consumers. A given level of economic
activity (employment, value added) can be reached by different sectoral compositions. Some
production sectors are more energy intensive than others because of the production processes they
require. An economy that has a higher share of its production factors employed in iron and steel,
chemical and or building materials will always be more energy intensive. National carbon emissions
can be reduced by moving to a less energy intensive production structure. World-wide carbon
emissions are not necessarily reduced if the energy intensive activities are located abroad.
Industry
Once the level of economic activity per sector has been determined, industry can through better
management and changes in production processes decrease its final energy use. The final energy use
is the energy sold by the energy sector to the non-energy industry and to the rest of the economy. We
distinguish between choices on the level of energy services and choices on the energy efficiency level
to produce the energy services. Energy services to industry correspond to physical levels of
production: tons of steel, glass etc. produced. This concept is somewhat abstract for non-homogenous
sectors. A given level of energy services can be reached by more or less efficient energy use and by
using more or less carbon intensive fuels.
These definitions allow us to model three ways of carbon emission reductions. First, one can through
better management and small product changes reduce the level of energy services needed per level of
economic activity. Second, one can improve the efficiency of the energy use process itself by
switching to other processes, combined heat and power production, better insulation, better electric
engines etc… Third one can work with less carbon intensive fuels (less coal and coke and more gas or
                                                  
3 Primary energy is the raw energy (coal, oil, gas, nuclear, renewables) that is imported or produced in a country before it is further
transformed and transported to the final energy user.
4 One knows that all primary fossil energy used in a country will ultimately lead to emissions, therefore CO2 emissions can be easily
computed combining primary energy consumption data per type of energy and emission factors by type of fossil energy. Sinks refer to
possibilities to capture CO2 emissions either via storage or via forests, etc.5
renewables). These different reduction possibilities are given in the 2
nd line of Table 1. This more
detailed representation is necessary to include technological information.
Households
The action possibilities for households are represented in the third line of Table 1. They have in
principle the same three possibilities to reduce carbon emissions. First they can reduce the level of
energy services: lower indoor temperatures, limit ventilation losses, drive their car less and more
carefully, etc. Second they can use more efficient appliances, better insulation, boilers, washing
machines, etc. Third they can use less carbon intensive fuels: switch from coal or gasoil to gas.
The energy sector
All final energy demanded by end-users (households, non-energy industry, service sector) has to be
supplied by the energy sector. This is represented in the second last column of Table 1. The energy
sector transforms primary energy (imported coal, oil, gas, uranium) into final energy (coal products,
oil products, gas, electricity). This sector can reduce carbon emissions by reducing its losses in
transformation, transport and distribution operations and by using less carbon intensive fuels in
electricity generation.
Available data and level of detail
We do not have statistics for all stages represented. The most important statistical sources are given in
italic in the first line of Table 1. For the economic activity, the left side of the table, we dispose of
macro-economic statistics that give value added per sector, prices of products, import and export
shares, etc.. The second source of statistics are energy statistics that tell us how much primary energy
is imported, how it is used by the energy sector and to what sectors final energy is delivered. This has
important consequences for the way we examine future trends in emissions and reduction
possibilities. The only “hard” measurements are final energy and levels of activity per sector. This
implies that one has the option between two modelling strategies.
The first is to use an aggregate and statistical approach and use functions that link final energy use by
sector to sectoral activity and prices on the basis of observations in the past. This will be the approach
followed in the GEM-E3 model
5, used in this paper to represent the main equilibria in the economy.
In Table 1, the second last line indicates the modelling domain of GEM-E3: the model focuses on the
sectoral distribution of economic activity but can give us only aggregate information about the level
of efficiency in energy use.
The second modelling strategy is to try to represent explicitly the energy use and production processes
in Belgium. This will be done in the MARKAL-model
6 used in this paper (see last line Table 1). This
model will be more useful to analyse energy policy options in detail. As there exist only aggregate
statistics on the energy use process, the measurement and representation of energy services per sector
and energy efficiency choices is more difficult and based on ad hoc measurements and many
assumptions.
                                                  
5  The GEM-E3 model is a general equilibrium model for the 15 countries of the EU. It has been constructed by a European consortium of
which CES-KULeuven was one of the main partners. It is described in Capros et al.(1997).
6  MARKAL is a partial equilibrium model for the Belgian energy sector implemented by CES-KULeuven and VITO with support of the
Federal Science Office, following the methodology developed within ETSAP, an IEA implemented agreement in which Belgium
participates.6
Table 1: Representation of carbon emissions and energy use of a national economy and their reduction possibilities































































Modelling domain GEM-E3 model
Yes 18 sectors Implicit and joint simple simple simple simple
Modelling domain MARKAL model
Constant Implicit 39 categories detail7
2.2. “Forecasting” energy use and carbon emissions with models
The future evolution of carbon emissions is the result of evolutions at all the stages that are
represented in Table 1. Building scenarios at the horizon 2010-2030 is a hazardous but
necessary exercise. Good scenario building satisfies three criteria:
1. Use all available information: this concerns technological information (present and
expected future performance and costs of energy use and production, present stocks of
equipment) as well as behavioural information (how did economic agents react to price
and income changes in the past)
2. Internal consistency: there are certain physical and economic equilibria that have to be
respected. The physical equilibria: all energy used must be delivered by the production or
import sector. Different conditions need to be satisfied to guarantee the economic
equilibria. There is the consistency between the production levels of different sectors:
when the output level of one sector decreases, this implies also reductions for the
intermediate deliveries by other sectors and by import. There is the consistency in the
income account: when the activity in one energy intensive sector is reduced without
increasing the value added generated in other sectors, the income level will decrease, etc.
3. Transparency: it should be clear on what assumptions the scenario is build.
In this study we have chosen to use two economic models: GEM-E3 and MARKAL. GEM-
E3 is a general equilibrium model for the 15 EU countries and models the level of economic
activity per sector. The main function of this model is to produce scenarios of sectoral activity
that are economically consistent. It contains a simplified representation of the energy
consumption and production activities but does not use explicitly technological information
on energy use (cf.Table 1 modelling domain of GEM-E3). For the transport sector, GEM-E3
was complemented with the transport module of PRIMES
7 to compute disaggregated
transport activity variables consistent with the economic activity derived from GEM-E3.
The main function of the MARKAL model is to integrate technological information on
energy use and substitution possibilities both at the energy use and at the energy production
level. It is called a partial equilibrium model because it takes the level of economic activity,
the level of income of consumers and the level of non-energy prices as given (cf.Table 1
modelling domain of MARKAL). Process emissions (non-energy related) for CO2 are not
included in the MARKAL model.
Now we examine the different steps in the building of the reference and policy scenarios.
                                                  
7 PRIMES  is a partial equilibrium model of the energy system constructed in the framework of the Joule Research Program of
the EU, DGRES, by NTUA with a contribution of CES-KULeuven for the transport sector.8
Figure 1: Procedure for scenario construction
PROCEDURE
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International Energy Prizes Other Exogenous Assumptions
- Overall Technological Progress
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economic activity
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2.2.1. Computing the reference scenario
The procedure followed in the construction of the reference scenario is illustrated in Figure 1
and has the following steps:
Step 1: Build a scenario for exogenous economic factors
The main exogenous factors are the international energy prices and the overall growth level of
economic activity. International energy prices have been derived from simulations with the
POLES model
8 that represents the world energy scene. The precise assumptions used are
discussed in the next chapter.
Step 2: Build a scenario for EU and Belgium economic activity
Here the GEM-E3 model is used to construct a scenario that is consistent with the exogenous
energy price and growth assumptions of step 1. The resulting medium term economic growth
for Belgium is calibrated to make sure it is in line with the Belgian Planning Office forecasts.
This gives a trend of economic activity by sector and a trend in disposable income that has a
macro-economic consistency. These trends in economic activity and in income are then
translated into trends for the demand for energy services (tons of steel, km driven, etc..),
                                                  
8 Poles is a model, developed for DGRES under the Joule research program, that represents the world energy demand and
supply (IEPE,1996).9
which determines the shift of the demand curves for these services in MARKAL over the
horizon considered.
This is illustrated in Figure 2 where we represent the demand and supply of energy services
for any sector A.  The MARKAL model has been calibrated to represent the energy market
equilibrium in 1990: the demand, supply and cost curves of energy services have to pass
through point B and the corresponding level of demand of energy services is X°. In order to
know the demand for energy services in the reference scenario, we need to know what is the
level of activity in sector A in the future. GEM-E3 gives us this information and this is
translated in the MARKAL model as a shift in the demand curve to the right (for an increase).
In step 3 this information is combined with information about the change in the cost of energy
services to obtain a reference level of energy services X
1 for 2010.
Step 3: Build a detailed scenario for energy use and energy production in Belgium
In this step, given the demand for energy services computed with the trends from step 2, the
base year (1990) demand and the policy measures already taken, MARKAL simulates the
choice of energy efficiency by energy users, their fuel choice, as well as the choice of energy
production processes by the energy sector. The final result of this step is primary energy use
and carbon emissions. In this step one uses information on the present and future availability
of energy technologies, their costs and performance at the level of the energy user and at the
level of the energy producer.
In terms of Figure 2, this step determines the cost of energy services in 2010 and the level of
demand for energy services, the point X
1 and translates this into energy efficiency, fuel
choice, energy sector activity, primary energy use and emissions. The demand functions for
energy services play an important role in the construction of policy scenarios. Every policy
scenario that affects the energy sector will alter the marginal cost of energy services and this
will affect the level of demand for energy services. The demand function for energy services
is a short cut to represent all substitution and behavioural reactions outside the energy use and
production sector.10
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2.2.2. Computing policy scenarios
To construct the alternative policy scenarios where the major instrument is at the level of
energy use or production, step 3 is replaced by step 4 where a least cost scenario is computed
to reach the Kyoto target. Step 4 needs to be repeated for every alternative policy scenario.
Step 4: Simulate a least cost policy scenario to reach Kyoto
Here we take the economic growth, its sectoral allocation and the international energy prices
as given. Also the shifts of the demand curve over time are those defined in the reference
scenario. Next one requires the MARKAL model to compute additional measures such as to
reach the Kyoto target at lowest cost. This will give rise to changes in energy efficiency at the
user and producer’s end. These changes will affect the cost of energy services to consumers
and this will affect their level of demand for energy services via the demand function.
The alternative path comprises adjustments on the side of the producers as well as of the users
of energy and also includes a lowering of the overall level of energy services. In terms of
Figure 2, a policy scenario could increase the cost and the price of energy services (say via a
tax). This means that we simulate the movement from point C to point D with MARKAL.
The least cost solution will depend on the cost concept used. Cost concepts are discussed in
the next sections.
2.3. Computing the cost of a greenhouse policy
2.3.1. Some first principles
A first important principle is that the cost of a policy is always computed relative to a
reference state. One works with the difference between costs rather than the absolute costs in
the reference state and in the alternative.11
A second important principle is that the definition of a cost depends on who the decision
maker is. If the decision maker is a household or a firm, the private cost
9 is relevant. But we
are interested in computing the cost for the Belgian society as a whole. We make the
assumption that the policy maker is concerned about the general level of well being of the
Belgian population. We measure this by the total income (“or equivalent income”) the
Belgian population would be willing to pay to avoid the transition from the reference state to
the alternative. As we measure the cost of reaching a given reduction of GHG emissions, we
do not take into account the reduced damage of climate change.
We make two implicit assumptions. First we suppose that the informed citizen knows best
what is good for him (consumer sovereignty) and second that we do not need to weight the
losses for the different income groups. The second assumption can be justified if the
government has other, more performant instruments to redistribute income. Note also that by
expressing all costs in monetary terms it is possible to take into account the value of changes
in non market goods such as travel time and the damage of other air pollutants than GHG.
We use three alternative cost concepts in this study, we call them cost 1, cost 2 and cost 3 in
order to avoid confusion with cost concepts used in other studies. Cost 2 and cost 3 are more
complete concepts but more difficult to use. The following box summarises the definitions
that are used.
                                                  
9 A private cost is the cost effectively encountered by an economic agent and will include taxes, subsidies and market prices.12
Cost = always difference with reference in a future year
Cost 1 = loss in consumer surplus on market of energy services + net loss in government
revenue on energy market
Cost 2 = Cost 1 + secondary benefits for air pollution and saved congestion costs
Cost 3 = Cost 2 + labour market/other macroeconomic correction
The labour market correction is necessary if environmental tax revenues are used to reduce
labour taxes
2.3.2. Cost 1 = loss in consumer surplus on market of energy services + loss
in government revenue on energy market
In order to illustrate this concept, we use two graphical examples. Figure 3 represents the
simplest case. In this figure the demand curve for energy services D is downward sloping and
represents the willingness to pay for energy services of a consumer. At the price P° he
consumes a quantity Q°. In this case we assume that emissions of GHG are proportional to the
quantity of energy services consumed. Imagine now that we need to reduce the emission of
GHG of this person by 50%. To reach this we use a tax t² on energy. The new price is
P²=P°+t² and the new quantity is Q². The total welfare cost of this decrease in energy use is
the sum of two terms:
+ the loss in consumer surplus = DABE +ACB



















































The net effect of this is the area ACB: this is a welfare loss for society because the consumers
were ready to pay between P² and P° for the last units of energy consumed and in the
reference situation they only had to pay P° for this. Now they are restricted to a quantity Q²
and they forego this opportunity of surplus.
A tax is not considered as a cost to the society: it is a pure transfer. This procedure is correct
under three assumptions: the administrative cost of raising revenue is negligible, the extra tax
revenue is not wasted by the government and there are no important distortions on other
markets (we return to this assumption in the discussion of the cost 3 concept).
In the second case, we consider a more typical case where the consumer of energy services
combines equipment (heater, insulation etc.) and energy. In the reference situation, the
consumer needs energy inputs that cost him PE° per unit of energy service (litres of gasoil per
m³ of his home that is heated) and other inputs (insulation etc.) that cost him PM° per unit of
energy service. The total cost per unit of energy service is PE° + PM° and this means that our14
consumer chooses a level of energy use Q°. Emissions are proportional to the level of energy
used.
Consider now the imposition of a tax of 100% (t
1 = PE°) on energy consumption to reduce the
emission of GHG.  The initial reaction will be an increase in the cost of energy services to
PE°+t
1+PM°. This is not an optimal reaction for the consumer: he can reduce his total costs
by investing in energy saving equipment. The cost of the investment in energy saving
equipment is PM² (PM²>PM°) and assume energy saving is 50%. Then the new price for
energy services is only 50 % of the previous one (PE² = 0.5 PE°) and he also pays only 50%
of the taxes he paid before the energy saving equipment (t
2 = 0.5 t
1). The total cost of energy
services now becomes PE²+t²+PM². The consumer pays more for his energy equipment
(energy saving equipment) but less for energy and emission taxes. He chooses now a level of
energy services equal to Q
2.
When we compute the net welfare cost of this operation we have the loss in consumer surplus
(consumer surplus after the policy change – consumer surplus before the policy change) to
which we have to add the change in tax revenues:
+ loss of consumer surplus =  (PE²+t²+PM²) Q² - (PE°+PM°) Q°
= ABC + t²Q² + {(PE²+ PM²)- (PE°+ PM°)}Q²
+ loss in tax revenue =  -t²Q² (a negative loss is a gain)
The net welfare loss equals = ABC + {(PE²+ PM²)- (PE°+ PM°)}Q²
Both areas are shown in Figure 4. The first term (ABC on Figure 4) is the cost to the
consumer of reducing his level of energy services (comfort reduction) due to the more costly
energy. The second term is the increase in resource costs (net of taxes) measured at the new
equilibrium level of energy services
10.
Until now we have used the consumer demand for energy services as example. The same
framework applies to producers. The producers demand for energy services is also downward
sloping. This demand curve represents substitution of energy services by other production
factors and a substitution into other products. We will also use  the term loss of consumer
surplus for the producers : it is the producer as consumer of energy services.
In some simpler approaches, one restricts welfare costs of GHG abatement to the increase in
private costs or resource costs measured at the initial level of energy services: one neglects
the reaction of the demand for energy services. Those   approaches overestimate the cost of
GHG reduction, because one puts extra restrictions on the reaction possibilities of the
economic agents
11.
2.3.3. Cost 2 = cost 1 + secondary benefits
In this approach we take into account  that the reduction of energy use also leads to a
reduction of other air pollutants or other external effects. The reduction of these external
effects can be considered as a secondary benefit of the GHG emission abatement. This is
illustrated in Figure 5 that is identical to Figure 3, except that we have added other marginal
external costs (OMEC). The net cost of the greenhouse gas abatement equals now: ABC –
DFCB or the loss in consumer surplus minus the savings in other external costs. Again we can
                                                  
10 It is not obvious from Figure 4 why the unit resource costs with energy saving equipment is higher than the unit resource cost
without energy saving equipment: the basic intuition is that a rational consumer will always choose the best option for him. If
the unit resource cost with energy saving equipment would have been lower, he would have chosen this option already before
energy taxes are introduced.
11 This is the case in the Dutch study on options to achieve Kyoto (Beeldman et al.(1998))15
add, as in Figure 4, the possibilities to substitute energy by energy saving equipment but this
does not add any new insights.
This second cost definition is certainly more complete but there are two difficulties to use it.
First, it is not so easy to estimate these other external effects: they can range from
conventional air pollutants to noise and traffic congestion. This requires difficult valuation
exercises. In this study we will rely on other studies for this. The second difficulty with
secondary benefits is that they are the result of a lack of specific policies to address these
other externalities. Conventional air pollution reduction is a secondary benefit of GHG
reduction via energy saving because these externalities were not internalised in the reference
situation. Imagine the contrary. If there exists, in the reference situation, a tax on energy use
equal to the conventional air pollution damage, the level of energy use is already optimised
for this type of damage. Any further reduction of energy use will reduce conventional air
pollutants but also externality tax revenues and these two will normally be equal so that there
is no secondary benefit. When policies for other external effects are not optimal, there is the
risk that GHG reduction policies are geared too much towards abating also these other
pollutants and this may not be the optimal policy mix. In general it is better to implement

























Figure 6 Labour market effect of an environmental tax
L’ L
2.3.4. Cost 3 = cost 1 + secondary benefits + labour tax/macroeconomic
correction
The first two cost concepts concentrate on the market of energy services and neglected the
derived effects on other markets. This is justified as long as there are no economic distortions
on the other markets. Economic distortions are present when there are important taxes or
external effects that drive a wedge between the producer price and the consumer price on a
market. The most important economic distortion is probably on the labour market where the
social security contributions and the income tax drive a wedge between the producer’s cost of
labour and the net return of labour to the household. Moreover there can be unemployment in17
the sense that at the present minimum wages, the supply of jobs is smaller than the demand
for jobs. Disequilibria are more frequent for low skilled labour.
In order to study the interaction between environmental policy and the labour market we will
assume that the labour market is in equilibrium. This  assumption  is more justified for the
long run and simplifies the exposition. Consider Figure 6 where the labour supply of a
household is represented by the curve S. The horizontal axis measures the labour supplied
(say in hours per year). The vertical axis shows the wage per hour. Start with a reference
situation where there exist no pollution taxes. The wage before tax (marginal product of
labour) equals W and the net wage after tax equals (1-t)W, this gives an equilibrium quantity
of labour of L*. The economic distortion on this market can be measured by the triangle
ABC, also called dead-weight loss. ABC represents a loss because, at the level of labour use
L*, the real product of labour equals W, while the disutility of labour equals only (1-t)W. The
difference is a foregone opportunity to create economic surplus for society as a whole. If the
household would receive his full product of labour (W) he would work L** hours. The
welfare cost of raising one EURO of tax revenue is therefore higher than one EURO:
estimates vary between 20 and 40%.
Introduce now an environmental tax on the pollution associated to the production or
consumption of a given dirty good Y. This will raise the consumer price of this good Y with
two elements: an abatement cost incurred by this industry and an environmental tax on the
remaining pollution per unit. This price increase will reduce the real purchasing power of an
hour of labour, making the supply of labour less interesting. This will increase the distortion
on the labour market. On Figure 6, this comes down to a shift to the left of the labour supply
curve. This shift to the curve S’ decreases the supply of labour and the tax revenue from
labour taxes. The net  tax revenue loss can be approximated by the rectangle EACD. It is clear
that the magnitude of the tax revenue loss depends on the tax rate on labour and on the slope
and the shift in the labour supply curve.
When the tax rate on labour is zero, there is no distortion on the labour market and we can
work with cost concepts 1 and 2. When the labour tax rate is positive, the welfare effect of an
environmental tax becomes more difficult and will be the result of three effects (we disregard
here the environmental benefit of a pollution tax):
- abatement cost: environmental policies imply a reduction on emissions and this raises the
marginal cost and the price of the product – this is the cost 1 concept
- tax interaction effect: abatement costs and environmental taxes on residual pollution
reduce the purchasing power of labour and decrease the labour supply and the labour tax
revenues – this is an extra cost element
- tax recycling effect: the revenues from the environmental tax can be used to reduce
existing labour taxes – this is a benefit
It can be shown that the tax interaction effect is in general larger than the tax recycling effect.
Therefore there is an extra welfare cost of environmental taxes when there are labour taxes.
This has two consequences: first the total cost of an environmental policy increases and this
could lead to a less strict environmental policy. Second it becomes important to recycle the
revenue of the environmental tax as a reduction in the labour tax to limit the efficiency losses
on the labour market. This has clearly implications for the choice of environmental
instruments that will be discussed in the next section.
In more complex models, in which the interactions between the economic agents within the
country and with the Rest of the World are more fully represented, a fourth type of effect can
be present:
- tax shifting effect: the burden of an environmental tax can be shifted to the non-labour
suppliers (owners of land and fixed capital) or to foreign customers; this allows to have a
tax recycling effect that is larger than the tax interaction effect and there could be net18
efficiency gains associated to the introduction an environmental tax  - this will benefit the
suppliers of labour but will be paid by non-labour income and or by the rest of the world
This tax shifting effect is of the same nature as a secondary benefit: also non-environmental
policies can be used to obtain this welfare gain.
The relative importance of the different effects will depend crucially on the level of
parameters such as the price elasticity of labour supply and of export demand, on the capital
income distribution parameters.
As this study is a cost-efficiency study where GHG reductions have to be met at the lowest
cost, the cost 3 estimates are highly relevant for the choice of environmental policy
instruments. This will be shown in the next section.
2.4. The cost of using different environmental policy instruments
Households and firms will never volunteer to implement sufficient reduction measures for
GHG abatement. The government needs instruments to force the polluters to take abatement
measures. This can be done by using different policy instruments ranging from emission taxes
over tradable permits to mandatory use of more efficient technologies. In the following table
12
we illustrate the effects and relative costs that can be expected from the use of certain policy
instruments.
In the left part of the table we concentrate on the cost 1 concept: the welfare loss measured on
the market of energy services. In the first two columns we compare  different policy
instruments in function of the effects they have on input substitution and output substitution.
Input substitution means the reduction of emissions per unit of energy service consumed: via
the use of less carbon intensive fuels or via less energy intensive technologies. Output
substitution means the reduction of total emissions of GHG via the substitution to less energy
intensive outputs and consumption (reduction in the level of energy services used). The more
leverage points a policy has, the lower will be its welfare cost because one adds extra
flexibility.
In the third column we assess the relative cost 1 effects of a given GHG reduction. The first
instrument is an emission tax on GHG emissions. This will induce input substitution (fuel
switch, energy saving equipment) and output substitution (GHG intensive goods will be used
less in the economy). The cost 1 of using this tax instrument is taken as benchmark and is put
equal to 1.
Grandfathered emission rights (distributed to the polluters in function of the pollution in the
past) will be as efficient as emission taxes for cost 1 concept.
Other instruments will imply higher costs (concept cost 1). The reason is that those
instruments give the economic agents less flexibility in their GHG abatement decisions. When
the government imposes the use of performance standards (maximum ratio for emissions over
output) or technological standards, the welfare costs (cost 1) of meeting the emission
standards are higher. This can range from a 3% increase to a 50% increase or more compared
to an emission tax. Finally, an energy tax is a more costly instrument than an emission tax
because it does not stimulate interesting fuel switches.
The results obtained in the left part of the table are well known in the economic literature
13.
Polluters will in general prefer standards (technology standards or other) and grandfathered
permits to taxes because they consider the pollution taxes they pay as a cost for them while
they are no cost for society. They are not a cost because they allow to reduce existing taxes.
                                                  
12 Based on Goulder et al., 1999
13 Consult any environmental economics textbook, Baumol & Oates, 1988 or Kolstad, 199919
In the right part of Table 2 we introduce distortions in the rest of the economy. The most
important distortion is the existence of labour taxes (taking the form of income taxes, social
security contributions and indirect taxes on consumption). This distortion will affect strongly
the ranking of environmental policy instruments. This insight is new but important because
labour taxes do exist and are important. When labour taxes exist and the revenue of the
emission tax is returned under the form of a reduced labour tax, the first line in the table tells
us that the relative cost per unit of emission reduction equals 1.3 (rather than 1 when there are
no labour taxes)
14. Environmental policy becomes relatively more costly because abatement
efforts amplify slightly the labour tax distortions. This does not take into account any possible
tax shifting effect, which can reduce the cost to 1 in specific cases.
More important is the relative cost 3 of other policy instruments. All instruments that do not
raise revenues that are recycled via lower labour taxes, cost some 50% more. Grandfathered
tradable permits therefore loose most of their attraction and so do the performance standards.
Analysing the full economic effects of environmental policies is difficult because it depends
on many parameters. This means that the relative cost estimates mentioned in Table 2 give us
only orders of magnitude. Nevertheless the second best effects are too important to be
neglected.
2.5. Conclusions on cost concepts
In the rest of the text we will refer mostly to rankings in terms of cost 1. These are easiest to
understand and probably best known. We will occasionally also refer to cost 2 rankings
mostly for the transport sector where policies to address these other externalities could
influence the ranking of GHG reduction policies.  As long as we stick to one type of
environmental policy instrument the ranking of measures in terms of the cost 3 concept will
be identical to the cost 1 concept. The cost 3 concept will be used to select a least cost
instrument: this will be emission taxes as this instrument has the lowest cost 3.
                                                  
14 This is to be considered as an order of magnitude, one can consult Goulder et al. (1999) who made many sensitivity analyses.20
Table 2: Relative costs of reaching GHG reductions with different instruments with and without labour market distortions



















Large Large Large 1.3




Full Full 1 Large Large 0 2 or more
Performance standard
1 Full Partial 1.03 Moderate Moderate 0 1.35
Technology standard
2 Partial Partial 1.5 or higher Moderate Moderate 0 1.95 or more
Energy tax Partial Partial 1.04 Large Large Large 1.07
1 performance standard: imposition of a general efficiency standard, without specifying a technology
2 technology standard :  imposition of an efficiency standard on specific technologies 21
3. THE REFERENCE SCENARIO
The main objective of this scenario is to estimate the trend in the GHG emissions in Belgium until
2010. This scenario takes as given the policy measures already taken in the period 1990-1998 to
reduce the GHG emissions. This scenario will serve as benchmark for the other scenarios. The
methodology used is illustrated in the previous sections and more particularly in Figure 1. We discuss
first assumptions on the international economic activity and international energy prices. These are
used as input to construct assumptions for the Belgian macro-economic activities and for the level of
energy demand. The next step is to introduce the policy measures that have already been taken. The
last step is to compute in a detailed way the expected developments in the energy production and
energy use as this is the basis for the emission scenario.
3.1. Assumptions on economic activity and energy prices in the world.
The economic growth assumptions are based on those used in the European Commission (DG RES)
long-term reference scenario with the POLES model (P.Criqui & N.Kouvaritakis, 1999): 2.5% as an
average GDP growth rate until 2005 and 2.1% for 2005-2020, followed by a slowdown to 1.6% for
after 2020 the OECD countries.
For the short to medium term they correspond to those used in the economic forecasts of the Federal
Planning Bureau of April 1999 for 1999-2004. Though the Asiatic crisis and the problems in the
former Soviet Union have induced a slowdown of the growth in Europe after the revival of the
economic activity observed till 1997/1998, the growth in the US has continued, justifying the figures
above. The assumption is that the EU will pursue an equilibrated policy mix allowing a stable non-
inflationary growth and a soft-landing for the countries in crisis. The sectoral allocation of the
economic growth reflects the trend towards a service economy coupled with a decrease in the share of
the energy intensive sectors such as the iron and steel industry and the building materials industry.
This shift is however slowed down after 2010.
These assumptions are comparable to those used by the OECD in their World Energy Outlook 1998
and close to the average growth rate in the past.
The oil price assumption is based on the same European Commission (DG XII) reference scenario
computed with the POLES World energy model. In this scenario, given the assumption of a rapid
economic recovery from the 1997-1998 crisis and relatively moderate oil and gas resources, the oil
price in real terms continues to increase rather sharply until 2010 with a slowdown thereafter. Oil and
gas prices evolve in parallel.
For the medium term, other studies, like IEA World Energy Outlook, 1998 and IIASA WEC98, and
the Belgian Federal Planbureau assume that the oil price will remain constant in real terms. For the
long term, the results are more in line with the POLES work: the oil prices in 2030 are relatively close
in the different studies. A full comparison is available
15. We used the POLES reference scenario
because it is derived with a model in which energy demand and supply are modelled in a fully
consistent and integrated way and because it takes into account the latest development on the oil
market.
                                                  
15 See the final report of the European research consortium “Energy Technology Dynamics and Advanced Energy System Modelling”
(Chapter 5 and 12). 22
Table 3 summarises the growth and energy price assumptions used in this study.
Table 3: Growth and Energy Prices Assumptions (annual average growth rate)
2000/2005 2005/2010 2010/2020 2020/2030
OECD GDP 2.5% 2.4% 2.0% 1.6%
Oil ($90/bl) 4.5% 4.5% 2.5% 1.8%
Gas ($90/boe) 4.2% 4.2% 3.6% 1.8%
Coal 0% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2%
3.2. Belgian macroeconomic and sectoral background under the
Reference Scenario (REF)
3.2.1. Country Specific Assumptions
The European macroeconomic and sectoral evolution under the ‘Reference’ scenario is computed
with the GEM-E3 model, a linked general equilibrium for 14 EU countries. The general assumptions
described above were complemented with country specific policy assumptions regarding the evolution
of tax policies and public consumption and investment and general assumptions regarding exogenous
technical progress.
Table 4: Country specific background assumptions (annual average growth rate)
1999/2005 2005/2010 2010/2030
Public Investment 1.4 2.0 2.0
Public Consumption 1.3 1.0 1.0
Tax Policy Stable over the entire horizon
Technical Progress
Labour 0.8 0.8 0.8
Materials 1.0 1.0 1.0
3.2.2. The macroeconomic and sectoral evolutions for Belgium,
The evolutions, derived with the GEM-E3 model, are summarised in the box below.




GDP growth 2.2 2.1 1.8
Private consumption 2.3 2.2 2.2
Housing stock 0.6 0.5 0.3
Sectoral production
Agriculture 1.8 1.9 1.7
Iron & Steel 0.5 0.7 0.4
Chemical sector 0.9 1.0 0.7
Building materials 0.7 0.7 0.4
Non energy intensive sectors 1.6 1.7 1.4
Service sector 1.5 1.9 1.8 23
The sectoral activity levels and the growth in housing stock and private income (reflected in private
consumption evolution) are the main determinants for the evolution in the demand for energy services
in our reference scenario.
3.3. Technological options and modelling of the electricity sector
An important modelling assumption for the electricity production in the reference scenario and in
other scenarios is that the demand for electricity in Belgium has to be met by production on the
Belgian territory. This means that the effects of the European electricity market have not been taken
into account. We discuss this problem later.
All technological and cost data for this sector are based on the results of the Ampere commission to
be published in Dec 2000.
3.4. GHG policy measures already taken in the period 1990-1998
The main policy decisions concerning GHG emissions taken since 1990 and introduced in the model
are reproduced in the table below.
Table 6: Measures and policy instruments since 1990
MEASURES POLICY INSTRUMENTS OTHER THAN TAXES
Residential and Service sector
1. Improvement of the insulation level
in new buildings
1.1. K55 insulation level for new buildings in the residential
sector
1.2. Insulation standard for the service sector
2. Penetration of highly efficient
electric appliances and saving-bulbs
2.1 Subsidies for highly-efficient bulbs through agreement
with the electricity producing and distributing companies.
Industrial sector
1. Penetration of renewables 1.1 Subsidy of 2 BEF/KWh for electricity based on
renewables
2. Investment plan in the electricity
sector
2.1 New STAG power plants are built in 1995 and 2000
2.2 No new nuclear power stations and maximum lifetime for
existing nuclear power stations of 40 years
 FISCAL POLICY INSTRUMENTS (in 90BF/GJ)
1990 1995 1997
Industrial sector
Heavy Fuel (high sulphur) 16.0 15.5
Heavy Fuel (low sulphur) 5.3 5.2
Gasoil 13.2 12.8
Residential and Service sector
Gasoil 16.0 15.6
Natural Gas 15.9 15.5
Electricity 16.0 15.6
Transport sector
Gasoline 467.1 531.5 626.9
Gasoil 283.3 336.7 327.8 24
3.5. Evolution of the demand curves for energy services
The demand of energy services differs from the final energy demand: the demand of energy services
corresponds to the demand for heat in houses or industrial processes or the demand of vehicle-km in
case of transport, whereas the final energy demand corresponds to the delivery of energy products to
the consumers (cfr.Table 1). Final energy is one of the inputs into the production of energy services,
other inputs are e.g. heating equipment or house insulation.
As explained in the methodological section, we use the macro-economic activity evolution to
determine the shift in the demand (curves) of energy services.
In the industrial and service sectors, the demand function shifts at the same rate as the production or
the value added of these sectors, taking into account the evolution of the relative energy service price
and technical progress. For the households, the demand function shifts as a function of the evolution
of income and relative energy prices, with an income elasticity of 0.3 for heating demand, 0.5 for hot
water and cooking demand and 1 for specific electricity demand and a price elasticity of –0.3 for all
categories of demand. For the transport sector, passenger transport is a function of income whereas
freight transport is a function of the general activity level, with a price elasticity of –0.3
16.
The derived evolution of the demand for energy services in the REF scenario is summarised in the
table below.
Table 7: Growth of demand curves for energy services (average annual growth rate)
2000/2005 2005/2010 2010/2030
Industrial Sector Demand
Iron & Steel 0.2 0.3 0.1
Chemical Sector 0.8 0.5 0.6
Building Materials 0.7 0.5 0.4
Other Sectors 1.7 0.9 0.9
Agriculture/Service Sectors
Heat Demand 1.0 0.9 0.9
Other Uses 1.0 0.9 0.9
Specific Electricity Use 1.3 1.2 1.2
Residential Sector
Heat Demand 0.7 0.6 0.6
Other Uses 1.0 0.9 1.0
Specific Electricity Use 2.0 1.8 1.9
Transport Sector
Passenger Transport 2.3 2.3 2.1
Freight Transport 1.7 1.5 1.2
The demand for energy services serves then as input into the MARKAL model for the reference
scenario.
3.6. The GHG emissions in the Reference scenario
3.6.1. CO2 emissions
In the Reference scenario, CO2 emissions in 2010 are 10.2% higher than in 1990. Between 1990 and
2010, emissions decrease by 23% in the energy sector, mainly because of the increasing share of gas
                                                  
16 These elasticities have been derived from studies at CES and from literature review. 25
for electricity production. After 2010, the CO2 emissions of the electricity sector rise rapidly as
nuclear plants are replaced by coal power plants.
Between 1990 and 2010, CO2 emissions rise by 14% in the industry and 17% in the residential and
service sector.  In these two sectors, the main increase occurs in the nineties, while after 2000 (and up
to 2030), emissions remain more or less stable, as energy efficiency is progressively improved and the
growth in the number of household decreases. In the transport sector, emissions increase steadily
(+40% between 1990 and 2010, and +27% between 2010 and 2030), because of the demand increase
(at about 2% per year), while the improvement in fuel efficiency of the road vehicles remains limited
(0.4% per year).
3.6.2.  Electricity generation
In the reference scenario, as well as in all other scenarios, nuclear power remains the main primary
energy source used for electricity generation until 2010, because of the existing nuclear capacity.
Until 2010 the increase in electricity demand is mainly satisfied by STAG's and cogeneration. After
2010, however coal power plants are installed because new, more efficient coal power plants
(advanced and ultra super critical) become available and coal becomes relatively cheaper than natural
gas.  Indeed, the oil and gas prices are assumed to increase steadily in the long term, while coal prices
remain more or less stable. This contributes to a significant increase of the CO2 emissions, after 2010.
In this scenario, wind turbines (except inland ones) become cost effective, thanks to the subsidy to
wind energy (2 BEF/kWh). Nearly the full potential of wind energy is used as soon as the subsidy is
in place (2005).  Only the inland wind turbines, which operate in poorer windspeed conditions, appear
slightly later (2010).  In reality, it could take some more time to install the full potential of wind
turbines in Belgium, especially the 1GW potential of offshore wind farms.
Table 8: GHG emissions in the Reference scenario (millions tons)
1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030 2010/1990
Energy sector - CO2 29.7 25.3 21.3 22.8 45.5 69.1 -23.3%
Industry - CO2 29.7 33.6 32.8 34.0 35.8 34.7 14.5%
Residential & services - CO2 29.9 33.8 34.2 35.0 36.3 39.2 17.3%
Transport - CO2 21.6 25.6 28.1 30.2 34.9 38.4 39.5%
Other GHG (CO2 eq.) 3.6 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.7 5.8 17.0%
Total GHG (CO2 eq.) 114.5 122.5 120.3 126.2 157.1 187.3 10.2%
Shares per sector (CO2 only)
Energy sector - CO2 27% 21% 18% 19% 30% 38%
Industry - CO2 27% 28% 28% 28% 23% 19%
Residential & services – CO2 27% 29% 29% 29% 24% 22%
Transport - CO2 20% 22% 24% 25% 23% 21%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 9: Primary energy demand in the Reference scenario
1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030
Total primary energy demand (PJ) 2,068 2,292 2,324 2,417 2,624 2,741 26
Table 10: Electricity generation in the Reference  scenario (TWh)
Centralised 1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030
Pulverised coal (existing) 14.9 13.7 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pulverised coal (SC/ASC/USC) 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.4 47.7 81.9
IGCC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PWR nuclear reactors 37.7 42.5 42.5 42.5 29.5 3.5
Gasturbines 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
STAG 0.0 8.4 10.1 11.8 0.3 0.0
Waste incinerators 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Renewables 0.7 0.9 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4
Other centralised production 6.7 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0
Total centralised 60.5 66.6 66.3 68.0 83.2 91.1
Decentralised
Cogeneration in industry 4.2 8.7 13.3 13.7 14.5 15.4
Cogeneration in resid. & services 0.0 0.9 2.5 4.1 5.1 5.4
Other decentralised 3.5 2.1 0.0 0.9 0.3 0.3
Total decentralised 7.8 11.7 15.8 18.7 19.9 21.1
Total power generation 68.3 78.3 82.2 86.7 103.0 112.2 27
4. KYOTO SCENARIO
4.1. Major assumptions
In this scenario, we have imposed that emissions in 2010 must be 7.5% lower than in 1990, and we let
the optimisation model Markal chose the technologies to satisfy the energy needs in the most efficient
way.  As a by-product, Markal provides the level of CO2 tax that would lead to the same result. The
tax has to be imposed on all sectors (energy, industrial, residential and service and transport sector).
For after 2010, we have assumed that emissions must continue to decrease: in 2030, they must be 15%
below their 1990 level.
4.2. Results for a GHG tax scenario
Table 11 shows the CO2 emission levels per sector and Table 12 shows where the strongest reduction
takes place relative to the Reference scenario.  By 2010, the strongest reductions are in the industry
(31%) and in the electricity generation sector (26%).  Emission reductions are much smaller in the
residential and transport sectors (6% and 3%).
In the longer term (2030), emission reductions become stronger in all sectors.  New house insulation
measures, more rational use of energy in residential and services and more efficient cars lead to more
savings in residential, service and transport sectors.
Table 11: GHG emissions in the Kyoto scenario (millions tons)
1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030 2010/1990
Energy sector - CO2 29.7 25.0 19.9 16.9 19.5 29.8 -43.0%
Industry – CO2 29.8 33.3 31.8 22.8 19.0 17.2 -23.3%
Residential & services – CO2 29.8 33.5 34.1 33.0 26.3 15.9 10.6%
Transport – CO2 21.6 25.6 27.8 29.4 33.2 31.1 36.0%
Other GHG (CO2 eq.) 3.6 4.2 3.9 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.7%
Total GHG (CO2 eq.) 114.5 121.6 117.5 105.9 101.9 98.0 -7.5%
Shares per sector (CO2 only) – Kyoto
Energy sector - CO2 27% 21% 18% 17% 20% 32%
Industry – CO2 27% 28% 28% 22% 19% 18%
Residential & services – CO2 27% 29% 30% 32% 27% 17%
Transport – CO2 20% 22% 24% 29% 34% 33%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 12: GHG emissions changes in the Kyoto versus the Reference scenario
1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030
Energy sector - CO2 0% -1% -6% -26% -57% -57%
Industry – CO2 0% -1% -3% -33% -47% -51%
Residential & services - CO2 0% -1% 0% -6% -27% -60%
Transport – CO2 0% 0% -1% -3% -5% -19%
Other GHG (CO2 eq.) 0% 0% -1% -11% -17% -30%
Total GHG (CO2 eq.) 0% -1% -2% -16% -35% -48%
The marginal cost of GHG abatement is 820 BEF90/ton GHG in 2010. In Table 13, this tax is
translated into an excise tax in current prices, i.e. BEF2000 per unit of fuel. 28
Table 13: Additional excise tax per fuel - Kyoto scenario
 (in BEF current prices, without VAT)
Unit 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gasoline litre 0.6 2.5 7.2 8.3 19.7 20.3
Diesel litre 0.6 2.7 7.9 9.1 21.6 22.2
LFO ton 719.8 3198.4 9159.5 10633.0 25154.0 25876.1
HFO ton 691.3 3071.7 8796.7 10211.8 24157.5 24851.0
Gas GJ (GHV) 11.6 51.5 147.6 171.4 405.4 417.0
Coal ton 626.0 2781.5 7965.5 9246.9 21875.0 22503.0
Table 14: Welfare cost and primary energy demand in the Kyoto scenario
1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030
Welfare cost (% of GDP2000) vs Reference 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.4% 1.6%
CO2 & non CO2 Tax income (difference in % vs Ref) 0.0% -0.3% 12.8% 49.9% 153.9% 244.7%
Total primary energy demand (PJ) 2,069 2,284 2,294 2,207 2,102 1,926
Primary Energy, change vs Ref 0.0% -0.3% -1.3% -8.7% -19.9% -29.7%
To reduce CO2 emissions in the electricity generation sector, the coal power plants used in the Ref
scenario are replaced by STAGs.  As natural gas has a much lower CO2 content per unit of energy
unit, this allows substantial savings in CO2.  There are no other significant changes in the electricity
generation sector, because the full potential available to cogeneration (about 3.5 GW) and renewable
energy (1.5 GW of wind turbines) is already used.
Table 15: Electricity generation in the Kyoto scenario (TWh)
Centralised 1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030
Pulverised coal (existing) 14.9 13.5 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pulverised coal (SC/ASC/USC) 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.0
IGCC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PWR nuclear reactors 37.7 42.5 42.5 42.5 29.5 3.5
Gasturbines 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
STAG 0.0 8.4 10.4 14.6 27.2 63.3
Waste incinerators 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Renewables 0.7 1.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4
Other centralised production 6.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total centralised 60.6 66.8 64.9 64.3 62.4 72.4
Decentralised
Cogeneration in industry 4.2 8.1 13.3 13.4 14.5 13.7
Cogeneration in residential & services 0.0 0.9 2.5 4.1 4.9 3.7
Other decentralised 3.5 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total decentralised 7.8 11.0 15.8 17.6 19.4 17.4
Total power generation 68.3 77.9 80.7 81.9 81.8 89.9
As the temperature in 1990 was rather high compared to average figures, it is likely that a higher
reduction effort will have to be made in 2010, compared to the figures in Markal (which are for
average figures both in 1990 and 2010). One can estimate that the correction for temperature will
impose a further increase of 3.5% of total emissions; this implies a reduction of 11% in 2010
compared to 1990. The tax increases needed to arrive at this reduction level are given in the table
below. 29
Table 16: Additional excise tax per fuel - Kyoto scenario corrected for high
temperature in 1990 (in BEF current prices, without VAT)
Unit 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gasoline Litre 0.7 3.5 9.8 11.8 19.7 20.3
Diesel Litre 0.7 3.9 10.7 13.0 21.6 22.2
LFO Ton 854.1 4507.3 12476.9 15088.2 25154.0 25876.1
HFO Ton 820.2 4328.7 11982.6 14490.4 24157.5 24851.0
Gas GJ (GHV) 13.8 72.6 201.1 243.2 405.4 417.0
Coal Ton 742.7 3919.7 10850.4 13121.3 21875.0 22503.0
The higher demand for natural gas that is likely to occur in the EU by the implementation of Kyoto
policies in all countries can have an impact on the price of natural gas. Introducing a 10% increase in
the imported gas price does not give a significant change in the overall cost of the Kyoto, neither is
the additional tax needed changed, because its impact becomes only important after 2020, when the
increase in gas demand is the highest. The results show a greater shift towards conservation and a
smaller decrease in oil consumption.
5. SENSITIVITY STUDIES AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
In this section we look at sensitivity studies on the level of the international oil prices, on the
acceptance of new nuclear power stations. We also discuss some other issues as the cost of using
standards rather than taxes, the macro-economic effects of a CO2 tax and the role of the transport
sector in the reduction of GHG.
5.1. High oil price
5.1.1. Major assumptions
In this scenario, we assume that the high price of oil observed in the summer of 2000 will be
maintained (in real terms)
17 until the oil price in the reference scenario reaches this level.  Then, the
price resumes its growth according to the reference scenario. The price of other petroleum products
and natural gas follows the same pattern. The price of coal is unaffected.






































                                                  
17 An 80% increase in 2000 compared to the reference level has been assumed. 30
5.1.2. Results
The result of this scenario is a slowing down of the increase of CO2 emissions in industry, transport
and residential.  Overall, CO2 emissions are 5.9% higher in 2010 than in 1990, an improvement
compared to the 9.7% of the Ref scenario.
Table 17: GHG emissions in the high oil price scenario (million tons)
1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030 2010/1990
Energy sector - CO2 29.6 24.2 20.6 23.3 45.6 69.0 -21.5%
Industry - CO2 29.8 30.3 31.0 32.2 35.7 34.6 8.1%
Residential & services - CO2 29.9 30.9 31.4 32.4 35.1 39.0 8.3%
Transport - CO2 21.6 24.8 27.3 29.4 34.6 38.4 36.0%
Other GHG (CO2 eq.) 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.0 4.6 5.8 12.8%
Total GHG (CO2 eq.) 114.5 114.0 114.2 121.3 155.5 186.8 5.9%
Shares per sector (CO2 only)
Energy sector - CO2 27% 22% 19% 20% 30% 38%
Industry - CO2 27% 28% 28% 27% 24% 19%
Residential & services - CO2 27% 28% 28% 28% 23% 22%
Transport - CO2 20% 23% 25% 25% 23% 21%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 18: GHG emissions changes in the high oil price scenario versus Reference
1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030
Energy sector - CO2 0% -5% -3% 2% 0% 0%
Industry - CO2 0% -10% -6% -5% 0% 0%
Residential & services - CO2 0% -9% -8% -8% -3% -1%
Transport - CO2 0% -3% -3% -3% -1% 0%
Other GHG (CO2 eq.) 0% -10% -2% -4% -2% -1%
Total GHG (CO2 eq.) 0% -7% -5% -4% -1% 0%
The decrease in emission occurs mainly outside the energy sector and the reduction goes nearly to 0
after 2020. In 2010, the quantity of CO2 released by the electricity sector is even 2% higher than in the
Reference  scenario. However, this increase of emissions in the electricity sector disappears in the
long run.  When compared to Ref, the electricity production in 2010 relies more on coal (it was 7.4
TWh in Ref, against 10.8 TWh here), and less on STAGs (12.1 TWh in Ref against 8.9 TWh here).
The reason why coal is used in this scenario (instead of STAG) is that oil and gas prices are much
higher than in the Ref scenario.  It is thus cheaper to use coal power plants, which emit more CO2 than
gas power plants.  However, after 2020, the oil price in the two scenarios becomes similar again, and
the difference disappears.
The increase in oil price has a high welfare cost without significant decrease of the CO2 emissions.
The higher oil price has to be paid and though favouring energy saving measures it does not induce
any shift towards less CO2 intensive technologies or fuels.
Table 19: Welfare cost and primary energy demand in the high oil price scenario
1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030
Welfare cost (% of GDP2000) vs Ref 0.0% 1.7% 1.3% 1.0% 0.3% 0.0%
Non CO2 Tax income (difference in % vs Ref) 0.0% -11.5% -3.1% -3.0% -1.5% 0.0%
Total primary energy demand (PJ) 2,068 2,148 2,218 2,329 2,595 2,736
Primary Energy, change vs Ref 0.0% -6.3% -4.6% -3.7% -1.1% -0.2% 31
Table 20: Electricity generation in the high oil price scenario (TWh)
Centralised 1990 2000 2005 2010 2020 2030
Pulverised coal (existing) 14.9 14.1 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pulverised coal (SC/ASC/USC) 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.8 48.3 82.1
IGCC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PWR nuclear reactors 37.7 42.5 42.5 42.5 29.5 3.5
Gasturbines 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
STAG 0.0 8.7 8.5 8.9 0.0 0.0
Waste incinerators 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Renewables 0.7 1.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4
Other centralised production 6.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total centralised 60.3 67.3 64.9 67.9 83.5 91.2
Decentralised
Cogeneration in industry 4.4 7.6 13.3 13.7 14.5 15.4
Cogeneration in resid. & services 0.0 0.8 2.5 4.1 5.1 5.4
Other decentralised 3.5 1.2 0.3 0.6 0.2 0.1
Total decentralised 7.9 9.7 16.1 18.4 19.8 20.9
Total power generation 68.2 77.0 81.0 86.3 103.3 112.2
5.2. Can new nuclear power stations help to achieve the Kyoto target?
In the scenarios analysed above it was assumed as central hypothesis that no new nuclear power
plants could be installed. Because of the uncertainty around this assumption and the role nuclear
energy could play in the reduction of GHG emissions, we simulated a scenario where this option is
available. The impact is rather limited until 2010 but becomes significant from 2025 onwards when
the existing power plants are scrapped, as can be seen in the next table. This table summarises results
obtained with a slightly different reference scenario (one without subsidies for renewables and a
minimum of generation with coal)  and where the cost function includes benefits for the reduction of
other externalities than GHG gasses. For this reason cost figures can only be compared across
scenarios in this table. The table compares total electricity demand, generation by type of power plant
and total discounted welfare cost for scenarios with and without the Kyoto constraint and for
scenarios with and without new nuclear power stations. 32
Table 21: Electricity demand and production by technologies (in TWh) and total cost
of the scenarios compared to the reference (in % of GDP 2000)
In 2010 In 2020 In 2030
No Kyoto constraint
New nuclear






Cost: -0.1% of GDP 2000






Cost: -0.7% of GDP 2000






Cost: -0.5% of GDP 2000
No Kyoto constraint
No new nuclear






Cost: -0.1% of GDP 2000






Cost: -0.8% of GDP 2000






Cost: -0.7% of GDP 2000
Kyoto constraint
No new nuclear






Cost: -0.2% of GDP 2000






Cost: 0.1% of GDP 2000






Cost: 2.7% of GDP 2000
Kyoto constraint
New nuclear






Cost: -0.2% of GDP 2000






Cost: -0.3% of GDP 2000






Cost: 0.6% of GDP 2000
The following conclusions can be drawn from the results:
- Until 2010 the production capacities in the electricity sector are relatively fixed; imposing the
Kyoto constraint implies an effort to reduce electricity demand by around 3 TWh and the cost of
meeting the Kyoto target remains limited (comparing the scenarios with and without Kyoto gives
cost differences of  0.1% of GDP or less)
- After 2010, the results are different depending on the policy constraints considered:
- the GHG-emission constraint imposes the largest reduction in electricity demand,
86TWh in 2020 and 98TWh in 2030 compared to respectively 99TWh and 113TWh
when no constraints are imposed.
- the cost of the GHG emission constraint increases sharply after 2010, reaching in
2030 some 3.4% (= 2.7% - (-0.7%)) of the GDP of 2000 when the nuclear option is
not allowed and 1.1% (=0.6% -(0.5%)) when it is allowed.
- When no GHG-emission constraint is imposed, the welfare cost of the ban on new
nuclear is small and consists mainly in higher (non GHG) external costs that are
associated to the more intensive use of fossil fuels (mainly coal) 33
- with the GHG constraint and without the nuclear option, mainly gas power plants are
installed; without the Kyoto constraint either nuclear power plants are installed, and
when this is not available, a sequence of gas power plants followed by coal power
plants is used
- the contribution of cogeneration and renewables to reach the Kyoto target remains
very limited. Renewables are only interesting in the long run and when a GHG
constraint is imposed
5.3. The ‘Kyoto’ scenario under alternative policy cases
5.3.1. A ‘standard’ policy scenario
The previous results are derived under the assumption that an emission tax is used as policy
instrument. Standards are an alternative instrument to reach the ‘Kyoto’ target, which will however be
more costly. Even if the standards are differentiated over the different uses of energy to make sure one
mimicks the cost-effective solution where the marginal cost of emission reduction is equal over all
options, the remaining greenhouse gas emissions remain untaxed and this means that the reduction in
the level of energy services will be smaller. This reduction in energy services was an important part of
the optimal set of measures. In order to reach the total emission reduction required through standards,
one has to implement efficiency improvements  that are stronger than the ones implicit in the emission
tax scenario. Moreover as shown in Table 2, when labour taxes exist, the use of standards tends to
aggravate the existing distortions and the overall welfare cost of compliance will be much higher
18.
A good indicator of the cost increase due to the use of standards instead of an emission tax is the
marginal cost of GHG reduction. In the table below, the marginal cost (cost 1 concept) for both
scenarios is reproduced under the assumption that the policy maker has very good information on
technologies and costs. When this assumption does not hold the cost disadvantage of standards
becomes larger.
Table 22: Relative marginal cost 1 of GHG emission reduction for reaching ‘Kyoto’
target (Index 100 for GHG tax)
2005 2010 2020 2030
with standard 102 169 303 130
with tax 100 100 100 100
5.3.2. An ‘energy tax’ scenario
Imposing an energy tax instead of a CO2/GHG tax will increase the cost of reaching the Kyoto target,
as it does not give an incentive towards fuel switching, therefore leaving out one option for reducing
the GHG emissions. Comparing with a GHG tax (the least cost scenario described above), the loss in
welfare (discounted change in consumer/producer surplus) is increased with 4.2% over the entire
horizon 1990-2030.
5.3.3. Tradable permits
Tradable permits, in as far as they are auctioned, will in first approximation, produce the same results
as a GHG emission tax equal. The same caveats apply as for emission taxes. Tradable permits are
often preferred because they can be grandfathered and this means a transfer of income (or rents) to the
polluters.
                                                  
18 One could also add that standards are static and stimulate less technical progress. Endogenous technical progress is not represented in the
models used in this study. 34
When there are no pre-existing taxes on labour and there is a closed economy, grandfathering or
auctioning the permits does not make a difference: the marginal cost for any polluter will still be equal
to the price of a permit and it is this marginal cost that will steer the choices on the level of energy
services, on the type of technology and on the fuel.
When there are pre-existing labour taxes, the decisions made within the energy sector are still
efficient but the overall welfare cost of achieving the Kyoto goal will be much higher (+50 to +100%)
compared to a GHG emission tax. The reason is that the environmental cost aggravates the existing
labour tax distortions. The net real wage of labour has been decreased (by the increased price of the
carbon intensive consumer products) and there are no carbon tax revenues to compensate (being
partially) the reduction of the net wage. When there is an open economy, grandfathered tradable
permits may have smaller effects on the activity levels.
5.3.4. Voluntary agreements
Voluntary agreements are established between the regulatory agency and the polluters (usually
government and industry, respectively), where environmental goals as well as measures for no
compliance are defined. The use of this type of instrument is still limited and is usually applied in
other areas than those analysed in the present study (packaging, recycling, etc), though their
application in the industry sector is growing. Their impact will be closer to the one obtained with
standards than with taxes. The main interest of voluntary agreements is their flexibility. They are a
weak instrument to implement costly abatement measures implied by the Kyoto constraint.
5.4. The macroeconomic impact of the ‘Kyoto’ scenario
The GEM-E3 model was used to evaluate the macroeconomic and sectoral impact of a GHG emission
tax allowing to reach the Kyoto target in 2010. The revenue of the GHG is recycled through a
reduction of the employers’ social security contribution, while maintaining the public budget constant
in terms of GDP. It is also assumed that the other EU countries are following the same type of policy
to reach their own Kyoto target. 35
Table 23: Impact on the Macroeconomic Aggregates of the ‘Kyoto’ scenario compared
to the ‘Ref’ scenario (%change unless otherwise indicated)
2000 2005 2010
Gross Domestic Product 0.05% 0.18% 0.50%
Employment 0.07% 0.28% 1.21%
Employment (diff. in thousand) 2 10 44
Private Investment -0.01% -0.03% -0.19%
Private Consumption 0.09% 0.26% 0.45%
Domestic Demand -0.16% -0.51% -1.95%
Exports in volume -0.34% -1.11% -3.82%
Imports in volume -0.32% -1.04% -3.89%
Energy consumption in volume -1.06% -3.65% -13.26%
Real wage rate 0.20% 0.68% 2.01%
Tax revenues as % of GDP* 0.19% 0.69% 2.62%
Avg. reduction in social security rate* 0.43% 1.53% 5.71%
Current account as % of GDP* 0.02% 0.09% 0.43%
Terms of Trade 0.07% 0.26% 0.78%
Total atmospheric emissions
CO2 -1.86% -6.42% -19.96%
NOX -1.89% -6.59% -21.49%
SO2 -2.76% -9.49% -28.78%
VOC -1.05% -3.72% -13.39%
PM -2.98% -10.52% -31.63%
* in absolute difference
Table 24: Sectoral production evolution in the ‘Kyoto’ scenario (% change compared
to ‘REF’ scenario)
2000 2005 2010
Agriculture -0.04% -0.13% -0.51%
Coal -3.96% -13.13% -37.18%
Crude oil and oil products -1.23% -4.05% -15.68%
Natural gas 0.02% -0.05% -0.75%
Electricity -0.26% -0.98% -3.90%
Ferrous, non-ferrous ore and metals -1.01% -3.64% -13.12%
Chemical products -0.09% -0.30% -0.97%
Other energy intensive industries -0.07% -0.24% -0.62%
Electrical goods -0.08% -0.20% -0.62%
Transport equipment -0.02% -0.08% -0.65%
Other equipment goods industries -0.10% -0.24% -0.51%
Consumer goods industries -0.03% -0.06% -0.08%
Building and construction -0.01% -0.03% -0.18%
Telecommunication services 0.08% 0.29% 1.05%
Transports -0.08% -0.30% -1.06%
Credit and insurance 0.06% 0.20% 0.51%
Other market services 0.03% 0.10% 0.22%
Non market services 0.01% 0.03% 0.09% 36
6. SAVING CO2 EMISSIONS IN THE TRANSPORT SECTOR?
The transport sector represents in the EU some 25% of all CO2 emissions. In this figure the
international traffic in and out of the EU is not included. The majority of the emissions (85%) come
from the use of fossil fuels for road transport (cars and trucks). These carbon emissions have been
growing at a higher speed than GDP. The European Commission has proposed in its communication
on Transport and CO2, a wide set of measures to curb the growth of CO2 emissions. Almost all
measures proposed are also partly justified by transport considerations.
For passenger transport, one counts mainly on two measures: one affecting the volume of car use and
a second affecting the fuel use (and CO2 emissions) per vehicle-kilometre. According to the EU policy
paper, the volume of car use could be reduced by 11% when car use is correctly priced. This will
require a modal shift. The second principal measure is more fuel-efficient cars. This measure has been
accepted by the European federation of car manufacturers (ACEA). The agreement between the
Commission and ACEA foresees that the average emission of new cars would decrease from the
market average of 186 g/Vehicle km in 1995 to 140 g/vehicle km in 2008. The European Commission
is considering complementing this measure with fuel efficiency information to consumers and an
increase in fuel taxation and another vehicle tax related incentive. Other local measures (promotion of
cycling, speed limits, etc.) can each add a few percentages of emission reduction to these measures.
According to the Commission document, improved road freight logistics could reduce the empty truck
kilometres. Other important factors are improved land use planning and the development of efficient
rail-freight, inland waterways and coastal shipping to reduce the energy intensive road freight volume.
For air transport and CO2, a communication has been announced. This mode of transport has the
highest growth rate. Measures could include a tax on kerosene and fuel efficiency standards.
From an economic efficiency view, the EU agreement on more fuel-efficient cars is not the most cost-
effective way to reduce CO2 emissions. In the scenarios above, the use of this new car has not been
imposed, but when a CO2 constraint is imposed (the Kyoto scenario) this car starts to penetrate only
from 2020 onwards. The reason is simple. At present the use of fossil fuel in the transport sector is
already taxed at a rate of 200 or 300% compared to tax rates of 20% or less in the other energy uses.
The efforts to save fuel have therefore been pushed much further in the transport sector than in the
other sectors. For the consumer, automotive fuel is very expensive and from his point of view energy
saving looks interesting. From a society point of view however, energy saving in the transport sector
is not interesting because it consists for 75% in tax savings that are no real savings of resource costs.
This does not imply that there are no opportunities for CO2 saving in the transport sector. It is
possible that measures that aim to correct other inefficiencies in the transport sector produce
interesting side benefits in terms of CO2 reduction (S.Proost, K.Van Dender, (2000), S.Proost, (2000),
S.Proost, D.Van Regemorter, F.Lantz, V.Saint-Antonin,(2000), S. Proost, D. Van Regemorter (1999).
In the next table we show the possible effects on CO2 emissions of some transport policy measures
for Brussels.
In the table we compare different alternatives for the transport sector, using the reference scenario
(unchanged policy) as benchmark. The first column gives the welfare gain as compared to the perfect
optimum that can be reached with perfect pricing and regulation instruments. The ideal policy is full
external cost pricing and this generates a saving of CO2 emissions of the order of 22%. This policy
addresses all externality problems in the transport sector in a perfect way. Perfect pricing of external
costs leads to lower air pollution damage mainly as side effect of lower volume of car use. The lower
value of car use is the result of different effects that are mainly targeted at reducing congestion: more
car pooling, switch to other modes and a smaller number of trips. This table illustrates that the welfare
maximising policies for the transport sector are those policies that address as directly as possible the
problem of congestion and unpaid parking. Congestion problems can be tackled by time differentiated
cordon charging (toll levied on commuters at entrance of city that is differentiated between peak and
off peak). The unpaid parking distortion can be solved by making everybody pay for his parking
resource cost (at destination). Both policy instruments generate important welfare improvements. The
extent of the welfare improvement is correlated to the increase in speed they can generate in the peak 37
period. The effects on CO2 emissions of the less perfect measures is rather limited. The effect of both
measures can not be added.
Decreasing public transport prices or increasing public transport quality is often advanced as an
efficient CO2 saving policy. The effect of this policy is in general very limited because of several
reasons. First prices are already very low for Public Transport. Second, occupancy rates are in general
not very high.
Table 25: Welfare efficiency of alternative transport and environment policy











speed of cars in
peak (km/h)
reference 0 100 23
perfect pricing 100% - 17% 78 40
cordon pricing +52% -7 % 89 33
parking charges +32% -5% 95 26
7. CONCLUSION
This paper discusses the methodology and some results to assess the means and costs of meeting the
Kyoto target for Greenhouse gas emissions in Belgium (-7.5% compared to the 1990 level). The
policy evaluation takes into account three constraints: the reduction target should be reached by
measures that can be taken in Belgium, the reduction of GHG should continue after 2010 at the same
rate as the one decided for 1990-2010, no new nuclear power investments are allowed in the period
1990-2030. Given the background assumptions on growth and energy prices, Belgium has to reduce
its GHG emissions in 2010 by 20% compared to the reference level in 2010 to reach the Belgian
Kyoto target.
Using a GHG emission tax as policy instrument, which is the least cost instrument for meeting an
emission target, the cost per ton of GHG reduced reaches 820BF in 2010 and increases sharply in
2030. This sharp increase is due to the investment in coal power plants at the end of the horizon in the
reference scenario and the ban on new nuclear capacity. Though limited in 2010, the cost of reaching
the target, in terms of loss in consumer/producer surplus, reaches 1.6% of the 2000 GDP. The
macroeconomic impact of the Kyoto target in 2010 remains very small.
In 2010 the greatest reductions are in the industrial sector, -33%, followed by the energy sector, -26%;
the reductions in the residential and service sector, -6% and in the transport sector, -3%, remain more
limited. The Kyoto target is reached through a least-cost mix of energy services reductions, changes in
technologies and fuel switching that are triggered by the GHG emission tax. For after 2010, the
contribution of the residential and service sector becomes more significant whereas the role of the
transport sector remains  more limited. Opportunities for CO2 saving in the transport sector exist but
more through measures that aim to correct other inefficiencies in the transport sector and which
produce interesting side benefits in terms of CO2 reduction.
Using alternative instruments such as an energy tax or standards increases the cost of reaching the
Kyoto target. An energy tax leaves out one option for emission reduction, as it does not give an
incentive towards fuel switching. The loss in welfare is increased with 4.2% over the entire horizon
1990-2030 compared to the GHG tax. The use of standards will approximately double the loss in
welfare: the reduction in the level of energy services is smaller, because the remaining emissions are
not taxed and therefore stronger efficiency standards have to be imposed to reach the reduction target.
If the nuclear option is available, the total loss is reduced with 23%. The impact is rather limited until
2010 but becomes significant from 2025 onwards when the existing nuclear power plants are
scrapped. The reduction effort is shifted towards the energy sector, allowing the other sectors to 38
reduce their emissions far less. If a higher oil price was assumed in the reference, this does not reduce
the cost of reaching the Kyoto target. It has, already in the reference, a high welfare cost without
significant decrease of the CO2 emissions, because though favouring energy saving measures it does
not induce any shift towards less CO2 intensive technologies or fuels.
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